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Information Perception and Climate Change Adaptation 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I construct a model of individual adaptation to climate 
change in both the presence and absence of perceived climate change and 
examine agents’ cognitive processes of information selection and perception.  
 
I begin by constructing a standard utility maximization model for 
adaptation. Expected environmental damages are represented as a function of 
damages dependent on an agent’s believed state of the world. Assuming an 
agent’s beliefs about the state of the world directly affect her adaptation 
decisions, I then explore how the agent arrives at such beliefs to begin with in 
the presence and absence of objective information using a dynamic information 
updating model. Whether a certain information signal is perceived as objective 
is determined by the individual agent.  
 
An agent who processes information purely on its scientific validity 
alone will engage in Bayesian updating and realize the true state of climate 
change regardless of her priors. However, under the assumption that the agent 
attaches a measure of “opinionated-ness” to all information signals, a separate 
model is needed to describe how the agent assigns weights. This model takes 
into account how the agent’s priors affect the cognitive process of assigning 
weights to each information signal the agent encounters. Through this model, I 
demonstrate that reinforcement of the agent’s priors, especially that of false 
beliefs, is the most likely outcome due to behavioral and environmental factors. 
Though not officially modeled, I also analyze how information selection 
interacts with such processes, ultimately resulting in under-adaptation.  
 
Most of the previous literature that have analyzed the relationship 
between climate change perception and adaptation decisions have done so 
through examining the role of risk perception. By modeling an agent’s cognitive 
processes of belief updating, this paper aims to contribute to the existing 
literature by shifting the focus to how real-life behavioral or environmental 
factors may affect both the agent’s belief updating processes and adaptation 
decisions.  
 
2. Context and Motivation 
2.1 Political Ideology and Beliefs on Climate Change 
There is a well-established consensus among adult Americans 
regarding climate change and the degree of human contribution. According to a 
survey conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication 
(Howe et al., 2020), approximately 72% of Americans believed that global 
warming is happening, and 57% believed that human activity was the main 
driving force behind global warming. 
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 Though these numbers themselves do not seem problematic at face 
value, further analysis presents two major concerns. First, the numbers stated 
above fall far behind the consensus within the scientific community in which 
97% of scientists believe that global warming is underway and caused by human 
activity (Gustafson and Goldberg, 2018). There are several reasons that can 
explain this discrepancy between the scientific community and the general 
population: people’s opinions about climate change being affected by factors 
other than direct science, misinformation campaigns, and the lack of publication 
of a scientific consensus.  
 
 What is interesting is that all three factors have to do with how 
information is disseminated, perceived, and processed by individual agents. 
Accounting for other factors besides scientific evidence has to do with how 
much people weigh scientific facts against other types of information or beliefs; 
misinformation campaigns directly affect people’s perceptions of reality; wider 
information dissemination would allow more people to become aware of the 
scientific consensus and evidence in support of global warming.  
 
 The second concern in addition to the relatively low awareness among 
the general public compared with the scientific community is that these trends 
diverge even further when broken down by political affiliation. Whereas 95% 
of liberal Democrats and 89% of moderate/conservative Democrats agree that 
global warming is happening, only 44% of conservative Republicans do so 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2019). Such discrepancies exist in more complex 
assessments as well, such as whether one agrees whether different entities 
should do more to address global warming or whether global warming should 
be a “high” priority for the president and Congress. 
 
 Though the fact that political affiliation affects an individual’s stance 
towards climate change is nothing new, the larger concern is that, despite 
climate change and global warming being a scientific phenomenon, such trends 
hold true even when taking the level of acquired scientific knowledge into 
account. According to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center (2019), the 
proportion of adult Democrats in the United States who believed that human 
activity greatly contributed to climate change was positively correlated with the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge. However, such a pattern was not found 
among Republicans.  
 
 One good news is that these initial opinions towards climate change are 
not permanently fixed and can be reversed to some degree. Another survey by 
the Yale Program of Climate Change Communication (Deeg et al., 2019) asked 
whether people had shifted their beliefs on global warming and examined 
whether those who did shared any specific characteristics. Approximately 8% 
of Americans had shifted their beliefs in the past year, and 84% of those who 
did became more concerned about global warming, demonstrating that it was 
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possible for people to shift their beliefs in both directions. Out of those who 
became more concerned, 20% attributed their increased concern to becoming 
more informed about the subject matter and 18% to hearing about the impacts 
of global warming. This suggested that increased exposure to the relevant 
information could nudge, if not entirely persuade, people in forming “accurate” 
beliefs, which underscored the role of effective communication strategies.  
 
 The absence of a converging worldview towards climate change is 
concerning because an accurate perception of the status quo serves as a gateway 
belief for other derivative beliefs that potentially translate into public support or 
political capital for politicians to shape relevant public policies. Throughout this 
paper, I define the true state of the world as one in which climate change is 
severe, and “objective,” “correct,” or “accurate” information as one that relays 
or supports this worldview. 
 
2.2 Belief Polarization 
Based on the assumption that humans are rational (i.e. care about their 
self-interests), it would not be difficult to also assume that despite an 
individual’s current beliefs about climate change, she would be willing to 
change her mind in the right direction once exposed to new information that 
points. However, studies have shown that the exact opposite occurs in 
controversial topics such as climate change. Despite it being their best interests 
to update her beliefs in the direction suggested by the evidence, more commonly 
known as Bayesian updating, people with a strong set of priors (i.e. prior beliefs) 
come out of the updating process by holding on to their beliefs more strongly 
than before.  
 
 This phenomenon is more commonly known as belief polarization, also 
defined as a situation in which a group of people receive the same information 
but update their beliefs in diverging directions. This can also be observed among 
other contentious social issues, such as the death penalty or the use of nuclear 
weapons. Studies showed that both supporters and opponents of any social issue 
emerged as more adamant in their previous beliefs after encountering mixed 
information that incorporated both sides’ arguments (Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 
1979). This phenomenon also presented itself in encounters with purely factual 
reports, which has to do with the fact that despite information being “objective,” 
the individual perceiving such information is not.  
 
 According to Bayesian updating, a rational agent would update her 
prior beliefs on the basis of new evidence to form a revised posterior set of 
beliefs, and such beliefs would only be updated in the direction suggested by 
the evidence (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016). However, those who exhibit belief 
polarization will not take into account the unambiguous scientific evidence 
regarding climate change. To those agents, information signals are not taken in 
as objective facts, but instead attached with a measure of “opinionated-ness” 
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that is used to gauge how consistent each information signal is with their current 
worldview and used to solidify their priors. I will later show that this irrational 
process not only creates a gap between an agent’s input and output, but also in 
her believed state of the world and reality.  
 
 To reduce the gap between their believed and actual state of the world, 
agents must be provided with factually accurate and reasonably complete 
information. Based on this information, they should update their beliefs in an 
unbiased way that focuses on the factual content of the information provided 
rather than the degree to which it fits their social or political agenda. The reason 
that I emphasize “reasonably complete” as opposed to full information before 
an agent makes any changes to her beliefs is that full information may not 
always be valuable considering the costs of collecting information. Therefore, 
while a certain amount of information is necessary in making any optimizing 
decision, most people make decisions with less than complete information.  
 
 While the processing of information signals is dependent on the agent’s 
motivation and ability to comprehend information, this does not take away from 
the importance that scientific or political institutions hold in information 
dissemination. The chances of the agent picking up information signals needed 
to update their beliefs in the right direction (i.e. conducting Bayesian updating) 
can be increased by the wider dissemination of proper information and 
eradication of misinformation campaigns.  
 
2.3 Adaptation 
In the previous subsection, I stated that the way in which new 
information is inherently perceived by the agent (i.e. whether information is 
perceived as factual evidence or as a measure of “opinionated-ness”) affects the 
agent’s assessment of the state of the world and described how the processing 
of information may result in belief polarization when the agent’s priors are taken 
into account. In this section, I explain how the agent’s beliefs that arise out of 
such a belief updating process affect her adaptation responses, one of the two 
widely used strategies to manage climate change. This is consistent with my 
hypothesis stated in the introduction that the way in which an agent processes 
the information signals she encounters will initially affect belief formation, 
which will in turn affect the agent’s practical adaptation decisions (i.e. an agent 
requires forming a belief about the state of the world before making any 
adaptation decisions).   
 
Adaptation is defined as the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate change and its effects. In the context of global warming and climate 
change, it inherently carries self-protective characteristics (IPCC, 2018). 
Though adaptation can be carried out by entities with varying scopes of 
influence, I focus on individual responses throughout this paper.  
 
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 17 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol17/iss1/10
Along with mitigation, adaptation is considered as one of the two key 
strategies to combat climate change. The two strategies are not only 
complementary in that both are required to successfully reduce and manage the 
risks of climate change, but also interactive in that calculating potential damages, 
which affects predicting the efficacy of mitigation efforts, is a direct function of 
individual adaptation and behavior. A more precise prediction of damages 
would provide a closer range of estimates for climate change-related losses, and 
therefore lay out a more accurate timeline for mitigation that reflects the most 
up-to-date reality. Moreover, mitigation levels affect the magnitude of climate 
change, and greater rates of climate change will increase the likelihood of 
exceeding adaptation limits and the types of adaptation strategies available for 
the average individual agent (IPCC, 2014).  
 
While mitigation focuses on reducing emissions, which makes it an 
effective strategy only when conducted on a global scale, adaptation has been 
proven to effectively decrease monetary damages even at the individual or local 
level by using capabilities that are available to a particular community (Adger, 
2001). In fact, it is precisely because of its flexibility and capacity to be carried 
out at the individual level, along with the realization that a certain amount of 
climate change is inevitable, that adaptation has recently been considered an 
effective response tool against climate change — since climate change is very 
much underway, adaptation could help lessen the degree to which individuals 
and local populations remain vulnerable to some of the inevitable damages.  
 
Adaptation is also unique in that unlike other large-scale entities, which 
require a collective decision-making process, an individual agent is solely 
responsible for her adaptation decisions. This also implies that under-resourced 
individuals may be left vulnerable when proper information dissemination does 
not occur. Hausman and Stolper (2020) explored how information failures, 
which typically led the individual agent to systemically underestimate her 
exposure to pollution, affected housing choice as a function of a household’s 
distance from a pollution source. They found that when more information 
became available, individuals’ willingness to pay for environmental goods such 
as air quality increased, demonstrating a positive correlation between exposure 
to relevant information and people’s willingness and capacity to use it.  
 
Believing that information possesses the ability to directly shape an 
agent’s perception of the state of the world, previous research has attempted to 
demonstrate the link between perception, intention, and behavior. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (2010) created the Reasoned Action Approach (RAA) in which agents’ 
attitudes towards a certain behavior, their perceived norms, and perceived 
behavioral control were believed to determine their intentions, which in turn 
affected behavior. Findings consistent with this theory were demonstrated by 
Mase et al. (2017) in which they discovered that the beliefs that farmers in the 
Midwest region of the United States had towards climate change significantly 
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predicted adaptation behaviors. Furthermore, to the extent that adaptation 
strategies were influenced by beliefs, attitudes, and perceived climate risks, the 
rate and scope of their implementation were able to be influenced by 
information campaigns, education, and training, with social norms acting as 
behavioral nudges.  
 
More generally, the willingness to use risk-assessing information was 
found to be correlated with direct exposure, emphasizing the need for targeted, 
localized information campaigns. Higginbotham et al. (2013) and Bickerstaff et 
al. (2004) found that direct exposure to climate change impacts led to increased 
threat appraisal, and that only then were weather or climate information 
incorporated into adaptive or mitigative behaviors. This was consistent with the 
findings of O’Connor et al. (2005) in which water managers who had directly 
experienced adverse weather events were not only more likely to expect such 
events in the future, but also that their willingness to use weather and climate 
forecasts in their adaptation decisions was closely tied to their feeling at risk, 
regardless of its specific source.  
 
2.4 Misestimation of Environmental Damages 
In the previous subsection, I explored how the fact that information 
perception affects belief formation, which in turn affects adaptation choice 
makes it imperative for the information being disseminated to be factually 
accurate to begin with. In this section, I analyze how a misstep in either of the 
prior two steps (i.e. either information perception or belief formation) may result 
in an agent’s misestimation of climate change-induced damages.  
 
In principle, a misperception of the status quo could cause the agent to 
either underestimate or overestimate her environmental damages, preventing 
the most efficient use of resources. Failure to develop an adequate adaptation 
strategy would result in either underpreparing and facing more damages than 
previously thought or overpreparing and consuming more time and resources 
than was necessary. Between the two, I assume that underestimation is more 
common than overestimation.  
 
One reason I assume underestimation is more common is that 
governments typically institute regulations and preventative measures after new 
information comes into light. Only then do individuals and businesses refrain 
from conducting business as usual in compliance with such regulations. This 
holds true for pre-existing EPA regulations, which have generally become more 
stringent in light of new information, especially that pertaining to new pathways 
for damages. For example, the Clean Air Act (2017) was expanded from its 
original set of guidelines such that sources of air pollution that were initially 
regulated at the state-level became monitored by the federal government. This 
quickly established regulatory programs with more specific air quality 
requirements, federal enforcements, and federally issued permits. The 
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amendments also added several new pollutants such as acid rain, CFCs, and 
halon to the list of chemicals that needed to be monitored.   
 
Assuming that the public primarily refers to EPA regulations to obtain 
information about general environmental quality and its valuation (Hausman & 
Stolpher, 2020), it is evident that the average individual faces considerable 
obstacles if she wishes to predict the precise amount of environmental damages 
that she will face. Several factors may prevent the average individual agent from 
accurately assessing the progression of climate change.  
 
One of the reasons that the individual agent may not be able to accurately 
assess the progression of climate change is that national and local media outlets 
may send conflicting signals regarding the state of climate change. In this case, 
the agent may be prevented from forming a coherent set of beliefs about the 
state of the world or make the wrong assessment when she chooses a news 
source that seems more applicable to her (e.g. a national news source says 
climate change is severe, while a local news source may omit or relay the 
opposite information).  
  
Somewhat related to the different kinds of messages sent by different 
kinds of media is the fact that some media systemically bias their news reports 
for the sake of promoting “fairness.” J. Boykoff and M. Boykoff (2004) 
analyzed news reports from 1988 to 2002 and discovered that widely accepted 
journalistic practices and norms to promote “balance” not only diverged popular 
discourse from scientific accuracy, but also contributed to the biased coverage 
of anthropogenic contributions to global warming. Though not the focus of this 
paper, it was also found that some news outlets, in the interest of serving fossil 
fuel companies or other organizations, have been serving up climate change 
denialism. This demonstrates how news outlets, which constitute one of the 
principal sources of how ordinary citizens come to acquire information, may 
have various different motivations for reporting conflicting, sometimes outright 
false, information.  
 
 Another reason the individual agent may not be able to accurately 
assess the state of the world is optimism bias. Climate change is a particularly 
vulnerable field because such cognitive biases are more likely to occur when 
uncertainty levels are high. Howe et al. (2017) conducted a national survey and 
found that 57% of Americans believed that climate change would harm 
Americans in general, whereas only 42% believed that climate change would 
affect them personally.  
 
 This phenomenon is more commonly known as optimism bias or 
unrealistic optimism. When it comes to assessing personal risk, individuals 
evaluate their own situations differently from those of the general population, 
perceiving their personal risk of being harmed by a certain threat to be smaller 
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than the average probability. Through FMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging), Sharot et al. (2011) discovered that such optimism was partially 
derived from a failure to learn systemically from “new, undesirable information.” 
After asking participants to estimate a range of negative events both before and 
after being exposed to their true average probability, they observed that only 
when the estimates were more pessimistic did participants update their estimates 
accordingly. 
 
 Lastly, individuals may simply not have access to the most recent or 
accurate information that primarily circulates within academic or scientific 
communities. Even if they do have access, they may lack the capacity to fully 
comprehend academic reports and translate them into practical decisions. For 
each information source, I hypothesize that there is a measure of accuracy (i.e. 
how close it is to portraying the accurate state of the world) and potential bias 
(i.e. how systematically wrong it is) such that when agents misestimate such 
parameters, they would systemically misinterpret the information given and 
make decisions that are skewed in one direction. The average agent is likely to 
not be fully aware what the parameters are for each source, since the “true” state 
of the world is rarely revealed. Without such information, agents are left with 
no objective or reliable metric to base their decisions on. 
 
 A lack of access to information may have larger socioeconomic 
implications than previously thought as mentioned by Hausman and Stolpher 
(2020). Individuals tend to underestimate pollution by having only a partial 
understanding of the extent of hazards they are exposed to. Therefore, individual 
optimization decisions regarding consumption and adaptation will only factor 
in the effects of climate change indicators or pollutants they are aware of. This 
implies that the average individual agent will primarily refer to visible indicators 
of climate change and exclude less visible sources from her calculations. This 
also implies that she would also have to take time and resources to obtain 
information that would get at the “true” state of the world, since pathways of 
climate change are more diverse and complex than what an average individual 
can ordinarily think of. 
 
3. Theory 
Given the effect of psychological and behavioral heuristics on 
information perception and behavior, I will construct a model of individual 
adaptation to climate change in both the presence and absence of perceived 
climate change. I model an information perception model in which one’s priors 
and cognitive mechanisms for weighing information affect information 
perception, which in turn affect adaptation decisions. In section 3.1, I will lay 
out a basic behavioral model in which an agent optimizes the amount of 
adaptation. In section 3.2, I will lay out the damage function and its properties. 
In section 3.3, I will combine the elements of 3.1 and 3.2 to distinguish people 
into two categories based on their information perception habits. In sections 3.4 
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and 3.5, I will expand on such cognitive processes and demonstrate how those 
who believe information is inherently biased or opinionated will likely result in 
under-adaptation.  
 
3.1 Basic Behavioral Model  
I begin with a simplified model of utility maximization. The model is 
a standard utility model in that it depicts an agent optimizing over the choice 
of the amount of adaptation and a numeraire representing all other goods, 
given a budget constraint. For all of the models, it is important to note that all 
of the subsequent optimization problems represent the ex-ante believed utility 
she is making choices on, which is different from the ex-post utility she will 
actually receive when the level of damage hits. Based on our assumptions 
regarding cognitive heuristics and human behavior, I derive a simple 




𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑦) − 𝑑(𝑎|𝑠) s.t. 𝑃𝑎 ∙ 𝑎 + 𝑦 ≤ 𝑚            (1) 
 where the first term of the utility function denotes general 
consumption. This is increasing and concave with a diminishing marginal 
utility to provide a trade-off between general consumption and damages.  
 
• d represents climate change damages, which is in turn a variable of 
climate change adaptation ( 𝑎) . oote that the damage does not 
represent actual damages, but believed damages.  
• y represents general consumption, defined as dollars worth of 
consumption. For convenience, we assume 𝑃𝑦 = 1.  
• 𝑠 ∈ {0,1} is a binary variable that denotes the agent’s believed state 
of the world. 𝑠 = 0 represents a low level of climate change and 𝑠 =
1  represents the opposite. We also define adaptation as a binary 
choice variable such that she can choose to undergo either a low or 
high level or adaptation. 
 
The second term translates environmental damages as a direct 
function of adaptation dependent on one’s believed state of the world, 
represented as 𝑠. Because her utility would decrease as damages increase, 
unlike general consumption, this function is decreasing and concave with 
diminishing marginal utility. It is important to note that, even though the agent 
infers rather than observes 𝑠 and 𝑑, the true value of 𝑑 is what ultimately 
impacts her utility.  
 
3.2 The Damage Function 
The next component of the model is environmental damages. To ease 
calculations in the model, I simplify the damage function by taking a linear 
approximation. The damage function will be a function of the amount of 
adaptation chosen and have the state of the world as parameters: 
9
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𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑠                       (2) 
𝑠 ∈ {0,1} is a binary variable that denotes the agent’s believed state of the world. 
𝑠 = 0  represents a low level of climate change and 𝑠 = 1  represents the 
opposite. I also define adaptation as a binary choice variable such that she can 
choose to undergo either a low or high level or adaptation. Given this 
information, 𝛽0 represents the actual level of damages an agent will receive 
when she believes that climate change is severe but does not choose to adapt, 
since 𝑑 = 𝛽0 when 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑠 = 1.  
 
This is consistent with the basic intuition that a higher level of perceived 
climate change would result in a higher level of perceived damages. When 𝑠 =
0, damages become 0. When 𝑠 = 1, then 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎). Damages would be 
positive only when 𝛽0 − 𝑎 > 0, or 𝛽0 > 𝑎. However, 𝑎 is a choice variable, 
so either the range of 𝑎 is restricted to be from 0 to 𝛽0, or the price of 𝑎 is 
high enough such that a consumer would never choose to buy negative damages.  
 
Based on these assumptions, the damage function will entail the following 
characteristics: 
1) 𝑑(𝑎 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤|𝑠 = 1) > 𝑑(𝑎 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝑠 = 1) 
which means that given that there is a significant degree of climate change, a 
higher level of adaptation will decrease damages than a lower level of 
adaptation.  
2) 𝑑(𝑎 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤|𝑠 = 0) = 𝑑(𝑎 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ|𝑠 = 0) 
which means that given that there is not a significant degree of climate change, 
the damages would not be dependent on the level of adaptation. That is, the level 
of damages would be equal for both low and high levels of adaptation given that 
we predict a low level of climate change.   
 
With this damage function, I expand from the optimization problem stated 
in section 3.1 and incorporate a mechanism for processing and updating 
information. I represent 𝑠 = 𝑔(𝜎) as the strategy that maps a signal realization 
𝜎 into a guess about the state of the world, 𝑠. For example, given the fact that 
the agent believes that the IPCC is a credible institution regarding climate 
change (and thus, its information signals are accurate), 𝑔(𝑠|𝜎𝐼𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 0) = 0. 
This is because the institution’s credibility, among other factors, will lead the 
agent to guess that the state of the world is identical to the signal that she 
receives. Credibility is defined as an idiosyncratic belief in the accuracy of the 
source such that if a signal comes from that source, it causes an update in that 
direction. Updating in the opposite direction may occur a low credibility rating 
is assigned to the information source.  
 
Given the damage function, I expand from the simple optimization 
problem represented by equation (1) and incorporate the information updating 
mechanism. Incorporating this intuition into the model, the generalized utility 
function will look like:  
10




𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑦) − 𝑑[𝑎|𝑔(𝜎)] s.t. 𝑃𝑎 ∙ 𝑎 + 𝑦 ≤ 𝑚          (3) 
This utility function represents damages as a function of adaptation conditional 
on the guessed state of the world, which in turn is a function of the information 
signals received by the agent. This is different from equation (1) which 
represents a static model that assumes the agent to have a fixed believed state. 
Equation (3) represents a dynamic model in which she continues to guess and 
update one’s believed state from the information signals received.  
 
The basic intuition for the dynamic model is that when agents update 
information, they are receiving additional information that affects their 
assessment of the state of the world and environmental damages. This 
assessment occurs every time the agent receives information she deems relevant. 
However, not all additional signals necessarily translate into a new guessed state 
of the world. While some signals may overturn prior beliefs, some may reinforce 
them. In the next section, I lay out how this information updating would work.  
 
3.3 Information Updating  
With the given optimization problem in mind, I characterize the agent’s 
processing of information signals as a two-stage choice. The first stage is 
information selection in which the agent chooses to accept or reject the 
consumption of information even before becoming aware of its content. This is 
largely determined by her previous biases and personal characteristics, such as 
age, political affiliation, area of residence, etc. This may or may not reinforce 
her priors, but the absence of information stimuli will have no effect on her 
perceived state of the world and adaptation decisions and thus the level of 
environmental damages she will receives remains identical.  
 
The second stage occurs when the agent decides to accept the information 
presented. I assume that people update their beliefs in proportion to the degree 
they believe the information received is true. Expanding from this assumption 
and integrating the information processing model, I divide the world into two 
potential scenarios, the main difference between the two being whether the 
agent perceives the information presented as “objective” or “true.” oote the 
final outcome as the amount of adaptation, and the individual’s perceived state 
of the world as an intermediate outcome.  
 
1) Presence of an objective source of information 
In this scenario, the individual agent is an objective processor of 
information. Again, I define objective information as one that brings individuals 
to believe that climate change is exacerbating (s =  1). Accumulated 
information signals that point at towards the true direction of climate change 
will make the agent eventually believe that the level of climate change is high, 
which is consistent with Bayesian updating. However, we will prove in the next 
section that this is highly unlikely, since an agent’s priors not only affect her 
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initial behavior towards various information signals, but also on how she weighs 
subsequent information signals.  
a. s =  0 → s =  1 (enlightenment) 
b. s =  1 → s =  1  (reinforcement of true beliefs) 
 
2) Absence of an objective source of information  
In this scenario, an individual believes that all information is opinionated; 
she believes there is an agenda underlying the “objective” information. 
Therefore, the convergence that was seen in the previous section is no longer 
present and all four outcomes become possible.  
a. s =  0 → s =  0  (reinforcement of false beliefs) 
b. s =  0 → s =  1  (enlightenment)  
c. s =  1 → s =  0  (erosion/misinformation of beliefs) 
d. s =  1 → s =  1  (reinforcement of true beliefs) 
 
3.4 Information and Weights 
In the previous section, I assumed that an agent would update her beliefs 
in proportion to the degree in which she believes the information she received 
is true. In this section, I expand on this assumption by explaining the degree of 
this shift in terms of the different weights the agent places on each information 
source. In other words, I will attribute the different outcomes regarding the 
agent’s believed state of the world and the degree to which she shifts her beliefs 
to the fact that not all processed information is weighted equally. If two different 
agents who possess the same set of priors (s =  0) and encounter the same 
piece of information regarding climate change (𝜎 = 1) end up with different 
beliefs, this can only be attributed to the fact that the two agents have assigned 
different weights to the most recent information signal they have encountered.  
 
The different weights agents assign to different information signals 
ultimately dictate their beliefs and final adaptive behavior. To draw out this 
mechanism, I write a weight vector 𝑤 and a sigma vector 𝜎 that lay out 𝑛 
different weights assigned to 𝑛 pieces of information. I also write a vector 𝛼 
that represents an individual’s idiosyncratic characteristics, such as political 
affiliation or age group.  
 
I assume that an agent’s guess about the state of the world 𝑔 is a weighted 
sum of her priors and accumulated information up until that point in time. The 
updating process is parallel to Bayesian updating in which one’s prior set of 
probability distributions are altered after encountering an information signal. 
Similar to Bayesian updating, the proposed model is continuous in that an agent 
assigns a weight whenever she encounters new information, and if necessary, 
reassigns weights to previous pieces of information with their weights serving 
as a reference for their reassignment. Based on this hypothesis, the weighted 
information updating mechanism looks as follows: 
                     𝑔 = ℎ(𝛼) ∙ 𝑤0 + 𝑤(𝛼) ∙ 𝜎                  (4) 
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The first term represents the proportion an agent’s priors are taken into 
account in her decision-making process. An agent’s priors, which I represent as 
ℎ(𝛼), take on a fixed value based on the agent’s characteristics and are likely to 
be fixed (i.e. such biases are “predetermined” in the sense that individuals with 
certain characteristics are more likely than not to hold certain beliefs as true). I 
denote people’s previous biases as some function of 𝛼 and assign a weight 
vector 𝑤0  that represents how much an agent’s personal traits, and by 
extension, her biases, are considered even when new information comes in.  
 
The latter term, which represents the accumulation of an individual’s 
processed information, can also be written as the sum of the product of the 
weight vector and the sigma vector (𝑤𝑛𝜎𝑛). The first few signals retained in an 
agent’s memory at a given time are represented as 𝜎1  and 𝜎2 , and their 
corresponding weights as 𝑤1 and 𝑤2, all the way to 𝜎𝑛 and 𝑤𝑛. Similar to 
how I represented the agent’s priors, the weight vectors are represented in terms 
of 𝛼 such that if two people have distinct values of 𝛼, then they would assign 
different weights to it and come up with different guesses about the state of the 
world even if they receive the same information. In other words, the way in 
which people assign different weights to each piece of information is affected 
by individual characteristics, which can be represented by 𝑤(𝛼). Therefore, 𝛼 
contributes to both an agent’s priors and the way in which she weighs different 
pieces of information as updating occurs.  
 
Suppose that 𝛼 is a vector that represents political affiliation. While one’s 
political preference may contribute to forming prior biases about climate change 
in that one may hold beliefs consistent with party lines, it may also affect how 
one assigns weights to incoming and past information. For example, Democrats 
or younger people may not only be more concerned about climate change to 
begin with, but also more receptive of new information, thus assigning higher 
weights to such information signals as long as they are believed to be credible. 
  
Given that 𝑔 can only take on the value of 0 or 1, we set up the weight 
vector so that the sum of 𝑤0 and all other weight vectors 𝑤𝑛 equal 1. This 
ensures that according to this set-up, while both the sigmas and the prior biases 
are on the range of 0 to 1, 𝑔 will be as well. Though this would represent 𝑔 
as a number between the continuous scale of 0 and 1 (as opposed to discrete 
values), we interpret it as the guessed likelihood that one’s guessed state equals 
1. Therefore, the individual is taking on probabilistic, rather than discrete, views 
of the state of the world. This is more consistent with the idea that an individual 
does not have a static, discrete view of the world, but a dynamic and continuous 
one. Reflecting the change from a static to a dynamic updating process, we also 
alter the damage function such that 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎).  
 
3.5 Theoretical Implications 
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With the information updating model like equation (3) that takes into 
account the process in which different pieces of information are weighted, I 
hypothesize that when a new piece of information is processed, an agent can 
acquire any of the four possible outcomes previously mentioned in section 3.3: 
reinforcement of true beliefs, enlightenment, erosion of true beliefs, and 
reinforcement of false beliefs. The kind of outcome and that which happens will 
depend on what the agent’s priors are, how heavily the priors are weighted, and 
how heavily the agent weighs a given information source (i.e. how credible she 
believes it to be).  
 
Given the utility function, an agent chooses an optimal value of 𝑎 (i.e. level 
of adaptation) to maximize her utility. If an agent were exposed to correct 
information and was an unbiased processor of that information, she should end 
up at the best possible guess of adaptation regardless of her priors; if that 
decision was made based on a sufficient amount of information, she should 
arrive at her true optimal adaptation level. As the agent’s perceived state of the 
world changes, her damage function will shift as well, which will cause the 
agent to re-optimize her adaptation levels. In other words, an agent’s priors and 
biases create a gap between 𝑎′, which represents the optimal level of adaptation 
under the true state of the world, and 𝑎" , which represents the level of 
adaptation an agent undertakes due to her perception of climate change.  
 
Though not officially modeled, information selection is a source of bias 
that may affect the agent’s objective processing of information. I assume that 
most mainstream media and educational institutions lean towards 𝑠 = 1 such 
that if an agent with a prior of 0.5 (i.e. completely unbiased towards either 
direction) was continuously exposed to a random selection of sources with 
uncorrelated sigmas, she would acquire the belief 𝑔(𝜎) = 1. I also assume that 
people tend to consume a specific set of media that align with their priors and 
acquired beliefs rather than a balanced bundle, which suggests selection bias.  
 
Furthermore, such consumption habits would form relatively quickly after 
the initial exposure to an information source, since all information that the agent 
encounters would project signals that would continue to elicit subsequent 
opinions and reactions within the agent. For example, an agent who initially 
encounters a media source leaning towards 𝑠 = 1 may either be persuaded by 
it or seek out information to the contrary after thinking its argument is “false” 
or “overly pessimistic.” She would then seek out the next source that either 
confirms or goes against her initial belief, be persuaded or dissuaded by it, and 
continue this process until both her opinion towards climate change and her 
information consumption habits are solidified. However, the fact that there is a 
mutual interaction between the selection of information and opinion formation 
makes it easier for the agent to quickly acquire a highly opinionated belief. If 
the information signals an agent encounters over time point towards the same 
direction (i.e. the agent forms segregated media habits), it would be unlikely 
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that her beliefs will be corrected. Such behavior also affects the mechanisms 
that interfere with the agent’s information processing.   
 
I will now analyze how the three real-life factors laid out in section 2.4 
make under-adaptation, rather than over-adaptation, the more likely outcome. 
First, an agent who is too sticky with her priors will assign relatively small 
weights to newly perceived information signals. Information selection affects 
the process in which an agent forms her own opinions by determining the degree 
in which the agent may be willing to accept new information. This makes the 
overturning of beliefs in either direction unlikely since the agent is certain of 
her priors to the extent that she is unwilling to listen to new evidence that may 
contain updated or factually correct information. When the agent’s priors lean 
towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 0, she will come out with greater certainty of her priors since 
she will not have access to information relaying true signals about climate 
change. This is likely the product of the agent’s sticky priors interacting with 
her media consumption habits in that she will choose information that will 
further confirm, rather than cast doubt on, her priors to continue being right. 
Therefore, the agent is prone to under-adaptation. Though those with priors of 
𝑔(𝜎) = 1 are more likely to engage in some level of adaptation, it is unclear 
whether they may reach their optimal levels.  
Second, optimism bias also decreases individual sensitivity to risk by 
preventing agents from extrapolating factually correct information that apply to 
the general population to themselves. Agents prone to optimism bias will 
believe their own probability of being exposed to a certain risk is lower than the 
stated factual number, despite being aware of the damage function and the 
effects of adaptation on their expected damages. In the damage function 𝑑 =
(𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎) , 𝛽0 represents an agent’s true damages since 𝑑 = 𝛽0 when 
𝑎 = 0  and 𝑔(𝜎) = 1 . The value of 𝛽0  may differ based on a number of 
factors (e.g. geography, average regional temperature), but optimism bias will 
make the agent perceive a level of 𝛽0 smaller than its true value rather than 
affecting 𝑔(𝜎). With this perception of 𝛽0, assuming the agent has an upper 
limit to the level of damages she is willing to tolerate, she will choose a level of 
𝑎  equivalent to when she would have believed 𝑔(𝜎) < 1,  thus gravitating 
towards under-adaptation.  
Third, a lack of access to the most recent or accurate scientific information 
implies that the agent may disproportionately receive noisy information such 
that even if she were not behaviorally biased to begin with, she could end up 
with the wrong beliefs. With the aforementioned assumption that perception 
directly shapes behavior, the agent would gravitate towards under-adaptation. 
Furthermore, without continued exposure to scientific information, agents may 
lack the ability to critically process that information or assign the correct 
weights to subsequent information signals they encounter. Lacking the ability 
to process what is objectively true or important, agents may be tempted to “fall 
back” on their priors instead of going through the mental process of sorting and 
digesting information. Those without access to scientific information may 
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continue to believe 𝑔(𝜎) = 1 and choose their optimal adaptation levels, but 
the thought process is identical to the agent having sticky priors towards 
𝑔(𝜎) = 1.  
Furthermore, even if an agent has a prior leaning towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 1, it is 
more likely than not that the average agent is unable to keep up with the full 
scope of damages she will potentially become exposed to as climate change 
accelerates and new damage pathways are becoming discovered.  
Because I am assuming a dynamic model in which the agent perceives the 
world in probabilistic terms, the agent’s perceived state of the world is important 
for her adaptation decisions even if her perceptions are not precisely 𝑔(𝜎) = 1. 
I will divide this into two basic scenarios, when the agent’s perceptions are 
exactly 𝑔(𝜎) = 0 and when they are not.  
First, I assume that the agent’s perceived state of the world is 𝑔(𝜎) = 0. 
Given the damage function 𝑑 = (𝛽0 − 𝑎) ∙ 𝑔(𝜎) , the level of perceived 
damages is 𝑑 = 0 regardless of the value of 𝑎 the agent chooses. Therefore, 
the agent is free to choose whatever value of adaptation she sees fit. However, 
since adaptation is costly and requires consumption to be given up, if the agent 
believes that 𝑑 = 0, adaptation provides no benefits. Therefore, assuming that 
the agent is a rational economic agent, no adaptation will be done (𝑎 = 0).  
On the contrary, the level of adaptation greatly depends on the agent’s 
perceived state of the world if she believes that 𝑔(𝜎) > 0. If one agent believes 
in a larger value of 𝑔(𝜎) than another (i.e. believes with a higher probability 
that the state of climate change is very severe), it follows that the former would 
have to choose a higher level of 𝑎 if she wants to receive the same amount of 
perceived damages as the agent who is less cautious. While both agents would 
believe that they are receiving the same amount of damages, the actual level of 
damages would be very different since the former agent would undertake a 
higher level of adaptation than the latter. Furthermore, if the true state of climate 
change is more severe than that perceived by the agent who is more cautious, 
both agents would fail to meet the ideal amount of adaptation that is required to 
offset the damages they receive.  
When the agent becomes influenced by any of the three factors mentioned 
in the beginning of this section, reinforcement of false beliefs becomes the most 
likely outcome. I conclude that information has the possibility, but is not very 
likely, to overturn an agent’s priors that have been accumulated for a prolonged 
period of time. Simply put, without the surrounding community’s reinforced 
input or access to the most updated scientific information, it is difficult for the 
average agent who has a prior leaning towards 𝑔(𝜎) = 1, or even a balanced 
prior, to sustain a reversal in her beliefs due to behavioral heuristics. By 
underestimating the state of climate change, the agent is likely to a level of 
adaptation that is less than optimal, therefore receiving a higher level of actual 
damages than she had originally expected.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I constructed a model of individual adaptation to climate 
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change in the presence and absence of perceived climate change and examine 
agents’ cognitive processes of information selection and perception. With agents 
taking in information signals as inputs, the agent’s perception of the presence or 
absence of objective individual would affect the agent’s involvement in a 
rational Bayesian updating process. Those who do not believe in the presence 
of objective information are more likely to engage in reinforcement of their 
priors, and particularly reinforcement of false beliefs. With the assumption that 
beliefs towards a certain behavior affect one’s intention of carrying out such 
behavior, such agents were more likely to choose a level of adaptation lower 
than their optimal level, thus widening the gap between their expected and 
actual level of damages and utility.  
    Previous studies have focused on how individual perception of risk, 
including that of climate change, affects adaptation behavior, cognitive 
pathways relevant to risk perception, and motivation. However, this paper 
contributes to the existing literature by generating a standard utility model that 
takes into account the dynamic process of information updating and laying out 
how the behavioral and environmental factors affect such cognitive processes.   
As long as information about climate change is relayed from outside 
sources and individual adaptation behavior is directly formed by such 
communicative and cognitive processes, there will be an increasing need for 
more effective communication regarding not only the risks of climate change, 
but also targeted adaptation techniques. Kahan et al. (2012) suggested that 
communicators should endeavor to create a deliberative climate in which 
accepting the best available science does not threaten any group’s values, such 
as using culturally diverse communicators or information-framing techniques 
that invest policy solutions with messages congenial to diverse groups. The way 
in which information about climate change and the state of the earth is 
communicated and dissemination must be effective, nudging people to acquire 
true beliefs before they reinforce their priors with both selective information 
consumption and information updating. Further research could compare 
communicative strategies in an experimental setting, examining the most 
effective way to induce socially optimal behavior or increase the retention or 
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